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ABSTRACT
Android apps could expose their components for cooperat-
ing with other apps. This convenience, however, makes apps
susceptible to the exposed component vulnerability (ECV),
in which a dangerous API (commonly known as sink) in-
side its component can be triggered by other (malicious)
apps. In the prior works, detecting these ECVs use a set of
sinks pertaining to the ECVs under detection. In this paper,
we argue that a more comprehensive and effective approach
should start by a systematic selection and classification of
vulnerability-specific sinks (VSinks). The set of VSinks is
much larger than those used in the previous works. Based
on these VSinks, our sink-driven approach can detect dif-
ferent kinds of ECVs in an app in two steps. First, VSinks
and their categories are identified through a typical forward
reachability analysis. Second, based on each VSink’s cate-
gory, a corresponding detection method is used to identify
the ECV via a customized backward dataflow analysis. We
also design a semi-auto guided analysis and validation ca-
pability for system-only broadcast checking to remove some
false positives. We implement our sink-driven approach in
a tool called ECVDetector and evaluate it with the top 1K
Android apps. Using ECVDetector we successfully identify
a total of 49 vulnerable apps across all four ECV categories
we have defined. To our knowledge, most of them are previ-
ously undisclosed, such as the very popular Go SMS Pro and
Clean Master. Moreover, the performance of ECVDetector
is high, requiring only 9.257 seconds on average to process
each component.
1. INTRODUCTION
To ease and accelerate the development of apps, Android
takes a modular programming paradigm that empowers de-
velopers to focus on essential building blocks (i.e., compo-
nents [1] in Android terminology). Moreover, Android apps
could expose their components for cooperating with other
apps. For example, both Facebook and Twitter apps lever-
age an existing photo-capturing component exposed by a
camera app by simply sending a request to it. The photo-
capturing component in this case is an exposed component
that serves external requests from other apps.
In return for this convenience, exposed components, if not
well designed, might run into security risks. In fact, vul-
nerabilities might exist if a dangerous API inside exposed
components can be triggered by other (malicious) apps. We
refer to this class of vulnerabilities as exposed component
vulnerability (ECV), and the dangerous APIs in ECVs are
the sinks of potential attack flows. Usually, ECVs could be
exploited by an attacker to perform dangerous operations by
simply sending crafted inputs from a regular app to a victim
app, both installed on the same phone.
Several methods for detecting specific ECVs [19, 7, 26,
36, 32, 33] have been proposed in the past. In all of these
works, detecting these ECVs use a set of sinks pertaining
to the ECVs under detection. Specifically, Woodpecker [19],
DroidChecker [7], and the very recent IntentFuzzer [33] are
designed to detect permission leakage in Android apps, and
they focus on a specific kind of sinks that would directly
leak permissions once victim apps are exploited. A recent
work, SEFA [32], further considers some database-related
sinks that are aimed by ContentScope [36] for a special kind
of components (i.e., Content Provider). Finally, CHEX [26]
discovers potential vulnerabilities related to another kind of
sinks, which are the data sinks that might cause unautho-
rized read or write operations on sensitive resources.
In this paper, we argue that a more comprehensive and
effective approach should start by a systematic selection and
classification of sinks. Note that in the context of ECV de-
tection, sinks should be vulnerability-specific (i.e., vulnerability-
specific sinks, or VSinks) in contrast to the general data
sinks for privacy leak detection [2]. This approach will help
resolve two major issues in the previous detection meth-
ods. First, the set of sinks obtained from our approach is
much more comprehensive. It will therefore help the previ-
ous methods to discover new ECVs. Another and also more
important issue is that the prior methods are tightly cou-
pled with individual analysis requirements of their selected
sinks. They therefore cannot collaborate with one another
to form a more general detection method. Our approach, on
the other hand, breaks this coupling by admitting different
kinds of sinks and categorizing them for different analysis
methods.
Using this sink-driven approach, we adopt a systematic
strategy to select VSinks and classify them into multiple cat-
egories according to their different analysis requirements. In
this strategy, we combine multiple metrics (e.g., permission
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semantics and API names) to systematically define rules.
These rules are made according to a simple, but practical,
rule syntax. We further write a rule interpreter to automat-
ically select and classify VSinks according to the defined
rules.
Based on the categorized VSinks, our sink-driven approach
can detect different kinds of ECVs in an app in two steps.
First, VSinks and their categories are identified through
a typical forward reachability analysis. We employ an it-
erative intra-procedural algorithm with flow sensitivity to
perform this reachability analysis. Second, based on each
VSink’s category, a corresponding detection method is used
to identify the ECV via a customized backward dataflow
analysis. The backward, instead of prior forward, dataflow
analysis is chosen to adapt more categories of sinks and or-
ganically cooperate with the forward analysis. Furthermore,
we design a semi-auto guided analysis and validation capa-
bility for system-only broadcast checking for removing some
false positives.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• Methodology. We propose a new sink-driven ap-
proach to systematically tackling the ECV detection
problem (§3). This approach includes a systematic
strategy for VSink selection and classification, a gen-
eral detection method to identify all categories of po-
tential ECVs, and semi-auto guided analysis for ex-
cluding some sink-specific false positives.
• Tool and dataset. We implement our sink-driven ap-
proach in a tool called ECVDetector (§4). We also de-
sign three analysis enhancements in ECVDetector, and
the major one is that ECVDetector can validate broad-
cast checking, a capability that could significantly re-
duce false positives. Moreover, ECVDetector identifies
a total of 372 VSinks across four categories, as well as
183 data source APIs. We are going to release this
dataset to the Android research community.
• Evaluation and results. We evaluate ECVDetector
with the top 1K Android apps from Google Play (§5).
In total, we identify 49 vulnerable apps across all the
four ECV categories. To our knowledge, most of them
are previously undisclosed, such as the very popular
Go SMS Pro and Clean Master. Moreover, the perfor-
mance of ECVDetector is high, requiring only 9.257
seconds on average to process each component.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Exposed Component
Exposed components are a subset of Android-defined ex-
ported components (i.e., components that other apps could
access). Some exported components have reliable permis-
sions to protect them, but the exposed components in our
threat model are fully exposed to other zero-permission apps
or apps with only normal level permissions. This threat
model is also adopted in previous related work [19, 36]. We
detect exposed components according to the following rule:
RULE 1 (exposed component determination). A
component is considered as an exposed component when it
satisfies both two conditions:
C1: It must be enabled so that it could be successfully in-
stantiated by the system; AND
C2: It must be explicitly or implicitly exported so that
other app could access it without permission or only with
normal level permission.
Each Android app contains an AndroidManifest.xml file,
which defines a set of component attributes. Therefore,
the rule for the exposed component determination is to in-
spect corresponding attributes. Using C1, we can exclude
those useless components (i.e., those who set enabled at-
tribute as false), such as the already deprecated compo-
nents. For C2, the explicitly exported component are those
with their exported attribute set to true. The implicitly
exported components are by default exported by Android
convention. For example, Intent-based components with
intent-filter tag and Content Provider components with-
out exported attribute are implicitly exported (Note that
this default Provider convention is disabled since Android
4.2, but all other lower Android versions have to be compat-
ible with this convention.).
2.2 Problem Statement
Exposed Component Vulnerability, ECV, is one kind of
the classic confused deputy vulnerabilities [21]. The exposed
component mechanism in Android allows other apps to send
a request or input to the victim component. However, if the
victim component cannot differentiate whether the request
is from trusted parties or not and blindly execute its own
code for finishing the request, then it becomes as a con-
fused deputy. Furthermore, if the triggered “deputy” would
execute some security-related operations, then an ECV ex-
ists. In this case, the victim component is a stepping stone
for attackers and also the direct executor of attack behav-
iors. A model of such attack scenario could be found in [15].
Essentially, the ECV is originated from insecure IPC com-
munication in Android (mainly delivered by Intent this IPC
object), and a related problem is the attack on unauthorized
Intent receipt [8]. However, this issue is mainly due to the
ambiguity during the resolution of Intent messages, thus not
related to the ECV.
The impact of ECVs largely depends on the triggered
sinks and the working mechanism of victim app itself. Some
ECVs are serious (such as forcing the victim app to send a
SMS), while others could be even treated as bugs (e.g., start-
ing a private Activity for attackers). It is nearly impossible
to give a clear boundary between such vulnerabilities and
bugs. In this paper, we generally consider these two kinds
as vulnerabilities: (1) those cause security or privacy risks
to the user or phone, and (2) those have security impact to
internal status of victim apps. Moreover, issues in exposed
Activity components that require user interaction are not
included in our threat model, since they are not stealthy
and usually not recognized by vendors.
Our scope of ECV detection in this paper is the same as
two previous related work [19, 26] that use the sink-based
flow analysis. However, only detecting attack surfaces and
giving warnings (one focus of [8, 28]) is not enough for our
goal. Instead, in this work we try to discover the real ex-
posed component vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the
complicated attacks on unauthorized origin crossing [31] is
out of our scope, because it relies on too much browser-
specific domain knowledge. Moreover, two technical issues
(Java reflection and native code), are out of our paper scope.
This also implies that we only need to select sinks from doc-
umented APIs (i.e., those could be found in Android SDK).
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2.3 VSink and its Taxonomy
VSink, short for Vulnerability-specific Sink, is a sink API
where an attack flow could go to and related to ECVs. In
this paper, we consider VSinks mainly from these two chan-
nels:
C1: APIs that will cause security risks to permission-
protected or privileged resources; OR
C2: APIs that will make security impact on internal sta-
tus of apps.
VSinks can be further classified into four categories accord-
ing to their different analysis requirements. We introduce
these four categories as follows.
VS_Direct. This category of VSinks is usually related to
privileged resources, and they can be directly used to launch
an attack. For instance, the removeAccount is a VS_Direct
sink. Another example is SmsManager.sendTextMessage(),
which can send a SMS message to outside without the at-
tention of user. Analyzing VS_Direct sinks is relatively
straightforward, usually based on a path reachability anal-
ysis. A major difference between VSinks and sinks in other
Android works is that not all permission-required APIs will
be considered as VSinks, only the vulnerability-related ones.
For example, WAKE_LOCK and VIBRATE APIs are excluded.
VS_DirectByParam. This category of VSinks is similar
to VS_Direct, but they rely on the incoming parameters
to exhibit different attack behaviors. Different parameters
could cause different attack consequences. For instance,
ContentResolver.delete(Uri) could exhibit different at-
tack behaviors with different URI parameters, such as “con-
tent://sms” for deleting SMS. Analyzing such ECVs is more
complex than VS_Direct, because a chain of variable depen-
dences must be investigated, so that we can obtain the value
of parameters. Note that this category of VSinks has not
generally been considered in prior works (e.g., CHEX [26]
only consider some similar APIs when external Intent can
control their parameters, while such relationship between
Intent and parameters in our VS_DirectByParam is not nec-
essarily required).
VS_Input. This category of VSinks mainly fulfills the goal
of misusing privileged resources, and this kind of misuse re-
lies on attack inputs to flow into VS_Input sinks. Network-
related sinks are the typical examples of VS_Input, such
as HttpClient.execute(). Once attack inputs flow into
them, they could be exploited to misuse protected Internet
resources. Besides network-related VS_Input, APIs, such
as startService() and startActivity(), also belong to
this category. Note that although VS_Input sinks usually
contain parameters, this is not necessarily required. For
instance, inputs flow into the caller object of HttpURLCon-
nection.connect() will also cause VS_Input ECVs.
VS_Public. VSink APIs in this category are those which
might not directly transmit privileged resources to attack-
ers but will make them public to other apps. An attacker
could then leverage a local app to steal privileged resources
outputted from these VS_Public APIs. One typical kind of
VS_Public sinks is the output methods defined in the an-
droid.util.Log class, such as debug-level method d(String
tag, String msg). Vulnerable components might put priv-
ileged resources (e.g., GPS locations) to these output meth-
ods, and an attacker could collect these log outputs in run-
time.
Besides VSinks, data source APIs are also related to spe-
cific ECV detection (e.g., VS_Public ECVs). In this paper,
we consider the data source APIs that can read permission-
protected resources and call them VSource, such as the BLUE-
TOOTH APIs.
3. ECVDetector DESIGN
In this section, we present our design of ECVDetector,
which implements the sink-driven approach to systemati-
cally tackling the ECV detection problem. As shown in
Figure 1, ECVDetector first selects and classifies VSinks.
Then based on these VSinks, we propose a general detec-
tion method to identify all categories of potential ECVs.
This method organically combines forward reachability and
backward dataflow analysis, and drives them by the charac-
terized VSinks. In particular, we take the backward, instead
of previous forward, dataflow analysis for adapting more cat-
egories of sinks, such as the VS_DirectByParam category.
Forward Reachability Analysis
Select and Classify VSinks
Determine Their Categories
Reached VSinks
VS_Direct
Final Potential ECVs
Semi-auto Guided Analysis
Backward Dataflow Analysis
Input à 
VS_Input
VSource à 
VS_Public
Value à 
VS_DirectByParam
Initial Potential ECVs
§3.1 
§3.2 
§3.3 
Figure 1: The overall work flow of ECVDetector.
More specifically, the first step produces a number of cat-
egorized VSinks, which are the dataset for the subsequent
analysis. Then ECVDetector employs a core module with a
typical forward reachability analysis to tackle the common
analysis task (i.e., identifying all reachable VSink calls from
attack entry points), and further leverages a customized
backward dataflow analysis to handle different categories of
VSinks in several dedicated modules. As the last step, a
semi-auto guided analysis is conducted for excluding some
sink-specific false positives. In the following three sections,
we will discuss each critical analysis phase in more detail.
3.1 VSink Selection and Classification
We propose a systematic strategy for VSink selection and
classification. The basic idea of this strategy is that we
combine multiple metrics (e.g., permission semantics and
API names) to systematically define rules. These rules are
made according to a simple, but practical, rule syntax. We
further write a rule interpreter to automatically select and
classify VSinks according to the defined rules.
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Most of VSinks are selected from permission-protected
or privileged APIs, according to the C1 channel in §2.3.
However, Android does not provide a complete and accu-
rate mapping for permissions and their corresponding API
calls. In fact, permission information provided by Android
developer document is limited and might contain errors [14].
However, two great works [14, 3] have attempted to address
this limitation. Specifically, Stowaway [14] constructs map-
pings for Android 2.2 framework using dynamic API fuzzing.
In contrast, PScout [3] employs a version-independent static
analysis method to extract permission specifications from
multiple versions of Android.
In this paper, we adopt API-to-permission mappings from
Stowaway instead of PScout for two reasons. First, although
PScout provides a significant number of undocumented APIs,
we only select VSinks from the range of documented APIs
(see §2.2). In terms of documented APIs, PScout does not
provide more permission mappings than Stowaway. Second,
we find Stowaway produces a more accurate mapping than
PScout, in terms of fewer false positives. This might due
to the fact that nearly every mapping found by Stowaway
is verified by dynamic execution. The accuracy of permis-
sion mapping is important for our VSink selection, because
any incorrect VSink will directly introduce false positives to
our ECV detection. Therefore, currently we only adopt the
mappings from Stowaway. In the future, we could also take
advantage of the version-independent feature of PScout.
We obtain a total of 456 validated documented APIs from
Stowaway. Assessing each API semantic is practically infea-
sible for two reasons: (1) it would take a quite large manual
workload, and (2) two much manual analysis without a prin-
ciple may incur some inaccuracy (e.g., assign wrong VSink
tags). Therefore, we propose to combine multiple metrics
for systematic selection and classification. These metrics in-
clude permission semantics and levels, API names, parame-
ter and return-value types. Among all metrics, permission
semantic is the major metric for our system. In fact, we only
extract 56 kinds of permissions from those 456 documented
APIs. Therefore, we can divide them into 56 clusters (if an
API needs multiple permissions, we choose its first marked
permission), because APIs marked with the same permis-
sion are likely to share similar VSink nature. For instance,
combining with quick scan of API names, we find all 6 APIs
under SEND_SMS permission can be directly categorized into
VS_Direct.
To facilitate multiple metrics based selection and classifi-
cation, we further design a simple, but practical, rule syntax,
as illustrated in Figure 2. Each rule is a five-element tu-
ple, which describes what tag a particular API would be as-
signed, when one metric of this API satisfies a special string
pattern. We define four kinds of pattern-matching actions,
such as “START” for “start with” action. Finally, the tag
in the syntax mainly includes four VSink categories. Be-
sides them, we also define a special tag named “Tag Delete”,
which can be used when we want to exclude an API. Based
on this syntax, we define four general rules and a set of
permission-specific rules for extracting categorized VSinks
from permission mappings. We then write a rule interpreter
to automatically select and classify VSinks according to the
defined rules.
Besides the privileged APIs, another channel to select
VSinks is the APIs that would make security impact on in-
ternal status of apps. Three general kinds of such APIs have
<rule> ::= <metric> <action> Pattern TAG <tag>
<metric> ::= @class | @method | @param | @return 
<action> ::= START | IS | CONTAIN | END
<tag> ::= VSink | Tag_Delete
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Figure 2: The rule syntax for VSink selection and
classification.
been considered in our work. The first kind is the file op-
eration APIs, such as the write and append methods from
the java.io.Writer class. Another kinds of APIs is the
database-related APIs, such as those from SQLiteDatabase
and ContentResolver classes. The third one is the logcat
APIs, i.e., logging APIs from the android.util.Log class.
We then design three additional rules to automatically join
them into our VSink set. Moreover, APIs from the Android-
HttpClient class (missed by both Stowaway and PScout)
are similarly complemented into our final VSink results.
3.2 Forward and Backward Analysis
3.2.1 Forward Reachability Analysis
We employ an iterative intra-procedural algorithm with
flow sensitivity to perform reachability analysis (summa-
rized in Algorithm 1). Note that since reachability anal-
ysis only relies on control flow, context-insensitive analysis
is enough in our forward module. The algorithm first con-
structs a control flow graph (CFG) for each method, and
then traverses every statement in a particular order accord-
ing to the search strategy (e.g., DFS). For each call site,
we determine whether it is a VSink or can be resolved into
a method defined by the app, respectively. In particular,
this call site resolving procedure is performed on demand
along the forward analysis. We maintain two lists for caching
reached VSinks and resolved methods. After the lists stop
growing, we obtain all reachable VSinks and then invoke spe-
cific modules to further process them. Finally, the algorithm
will handle each resolved method in the same way.
We generate call chains to facilitate inter-procedural back-
track analysis. A call chain is a path of call graph, from an
entry caller to an ending callee. Generating individual call
chains, instead of a whole call graph, could ease the path
track procedure of subsequent modules and allow them con-
centrate on the design of flow analysis. In contrast, traver-
sal between two nodes on call graph might involve several
parallel paths. Moreover, an additional dataflow fact join
operation needs to be considered in the dataflow analysis
using non-linear graph traversal.
Our call chain captures not only caller and callee meth-
ods, but also precise calling context information by recording
call-site heap locations and their call strings (both are not
shown in Algorithm 1, for simplicity). On one hand, the
heap location context information is essential for backward
modules to jump back to each original call site. Otherwise,
ambiguity might arise when a caller method contains multi-
ple similar call sites targeting the same callee. On the other
hand, we leverage call string to avoid re-analysis of callee
method with the same dataflow value context. More specifi-
cally, with the help of SSA IR form1, we can distinguish call
1SSA represents static single assignment, while IR is short
for intermediate representation.
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Algorithm 1 Forward Reachability Analysis
Input: entryP ts = [entry point], vSinks = [VSink]
1: for all ep ∈ entryP ts do
2: IterativeForward(ep, initchain)
3: end for
4:
5: procedure IterativeForward(method, chain)
6: reachedS = [], nextM = [], chain.add(method)
7:
8: cfg ← BuildCFG(method)
9: for all cs ∈ CallSites(DFS(cfg)) do
10: if cs ∈ vSinks then
11: reachedS.add(cs)
12: else
13: rc← ResolveCall(cs)
14: if rc ∈ [app defined method] then
15: nextM .add(rc)
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19:
20: for all r ∈ reachedS do
21: category ← JudgeCategory(r, vSinks)
22: InvokeSpecificModule(category, r, chain)
23: end for
24: for all m ∈ nextM do
25: IterativeForward(m, ShadowCopy(chain))
26: end for
27: end procedure
sites with different entry dataflow values through simply in-
vestigating their call strings.
3.2.2 Backward Dataflow Analysis
Except for VS_Direct, the other three kinds of VSinks
require further backward dataflow analysis. Although each
backward analysis is independent for a dedicated task, they
share a common backward dataflow analysis method. We
thus first design this common backward method and then
apply it to the three dedicated modules.
Our backward method relies on call chain (generated by
forward module) to achieve inter-procedural context-sensitive
backtrack analysis (shown in Algorithm 2). The core of this
algorithm is an iterative backward analysis procedure. This
iterative procedure starts with extracting SSA-form method
body from call chain according to current chain index. Then,
it initializes a intra-method taint set and joins the incoming
tainted variables. After this, we need to locate the starting
call site according to the provided calling context. If call-
ing context is the null (this can happen when we backtrack
between two originally disconnected callback functions), we
directly take the last call site as our starting point. Similarly,
we join the new tainted variables obtained from starting call
site into the taint set. We then loop all call sites before the
starting point. For each tainted call site, we further deter-
mine whether we need to propagate the taint into new vari-
ables. Moreover, different dedicated modules may choose to
mark result for tainted VSource or constants at this time.
After the loop, some modules would further inspect whether
there are tainted inputs. Finally, the algorithm will judge
whether it needs further backtracking, according to the cur-
rent index number and variables in taint set. For example,
Algorithm 2 Backward Dataflow Analysis
Input: cy: category, r: a reached VSink call, chain, vSrc
1: ii ← chain.size()-1, itv ← GetTVarsFromCallSite(r)
2: IterativeBackward(ii, itv, r)
. i: index, tv: tainted variables, cc: calling context
3: procedure IterativeBackward(i, tv, cc)
4: sb ← chain.get(i).GetSSABody()
5: ts ← InitTaintSet(), ts.join(GetTaintedVars(tv))
6: cs start ← GetStartCallSite(cc)
7: ts.join(GetTVarsFromCallSite(cs start))
8:
9: cs old ← cs start
10: while sb.hasPreviousCallSite(cs old) do
11: cs new ← sb.getPreviousCallSite(cs old)
12: if isThisCallSiteTainted(cs new, ts) then
13: ts.join(Determine-PropagateTaint(cs new,
ts))
14: MarkResult VSrc(cy, cs new, vSrc)
15: MarkResult Constant(cy, cs new)
16: end if
17: cs old ← cs new
18: end while
19: MarkResult Input(cy, ts, chain)
20:
21: if isContinueIterative(i, ts, cy, chain) then
22: lcc ← chain.get(i).GetLastCallContext()
23: IterativeBackward(i-1, TransformTVars(ts), lcc)
24: end if
25: end procedure
if we already backtrack to the first method in chain, or no
parameters and fields tainted, the algorithm will terminate.
Generating proper taint objectives is important for our
backward analysis. First, we need to obtain appropriate
initial taints from reached VSink calls. Since our current
VSinks have no fine-grained information to indicate which
parameter is critical, we then take a conservative approach
that taints all encountered parameters to avoid any false
negative. Moreover, some VSink APIs have no parame-
ters involved (e.g., previously mentioned HttpURLConnec-
tion.connect()), we thus taint their caller object. Second,
we need to maintain a mapping for tainted parameters dur-
ing the procedure of method switching, so that we can ob-
tain the correct variable format under different SSA method
bodies.
We further design three dedicated modules for tackling
ECV detection problems under VS_DirectByParam, VS_Input,
and VS_Public. With the help of proposed backward method,
these modules are relatively easy to design. Specifically, for
VS_DirectByParam, we mark the result from tainted con-
stants and inputs. Because sometimes static analysis can-
not obtain accurate parameter values, e.g., when they rely
on dynamic execution outputs. Therefore, we adopt every
tainted constants into VS_DirectByParam result, to mimic
the ideal values. While for VS_Input and VS_Public, our
main task is to backtrack whether there are tainted inputs
and VSource, respectively .
3.2.3 Analysis Enhancements
We also design three kinds of enhancements to the basic
forward and backward analysis in ECVDetector. In general,
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these enhancements can help ECVDetector reduce false pos-
itives, avoid unnecessary analysis overhead, and output more
expressive result logs.
The first enhancement is to validate system-only broad-
cast checking in the flow analysis. Broadcasts are system-
wide events (e.g., battery is low), which will be delivered
to registered Broadcast Receivers when the corresponding
events occur. For example, an Broadcast Receiver with the
name com.example.BootReceiver (see Figure 8 in the Ap-
pendix) registers the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast, which will
then trigger BootReceiver when the system has booted.
Note that although third-party apps can also declare their
own broadcasts, many broadcasts are only sent by the op-
erating system and prohibited by non-system senders [14].
Therefore, attackers cannot inject a fake broadcast Intent
with BOOT_COMPLETED as the action name into BootReceiver.
However, it is still insufficient to prevent external crafted in-
puts, since attackers can directly trigger BootReceiver by
set the explicit Intent target name. A safe and common way
to mitigate this issue is to explicitly check the action name
of system broadcasts in the code, as suggested in [8] and
[28]. A typical code pattern for such system-only broadcast
checking is illustrated in Figure 9 (see Appendix).
Since broadcast checking can efficiently protect exposed
Broadcast Receivers, we thus design a validation capabil-
ity for system-only broadcast checking in ECVDetector’s
flow analysis, as an enhancement to the forward analysis
in §3.2.1. Besides helpful to reduce false positives, this val-
idation can also improve the system performance, because
ECVDetector can avoid the subsequent analysis once it iden-
tifies checking. Our validation is targeted at the code pat-
tern in Figure 9 (i.e., the If-Else checking using equals API
in Java’s String class), since it is the most straightforward
way to perform broadcast checking. We also believe it is easy
for ECVDetector to cover other kinds of checking patterns,
once their domain knowledge is provided.
To facilitate accurate validation, a critical job is to collect
sufficient system-only broadcasts. Note that our goal is to
identify enough broadcasts that could cover most app cases,
and proposing a new way to dig out a complete set is out
of the paper scope. There are two existing related resources
we can leverage. First, the AndroidManifest.xml file in
each version of Android source code defines a list of system
broadcasts with the tag name protected-broadcast. We
thus collect 133 such broadcasts from the recent Android
4.3 platform. Second, Stowaway [14] uncovers 62 system
broadcasts by dynamic testing, including those dynamically
declared in the code. We then merge these two broadcast
sets into a new one, and finally obtain in total of 143 unique
system-only broadcasts for ECVDetector.
Second, we avoid backtracking some uncritical parame-
ters to reduce overhead. A typical example is the first
tag parameter of logcat APIs, such as Log.v(String tag,
String msg). Developers usually assign insensitive values
(e.g., string constants) into this parameter, thus there is no
need to analyze it. Otherwise, the backward module may
waste tracing several methods before arriving its initializa-
tion method.
Third, we output input-related variable values for more
expressive result logs. Our backward analysis could taint a
dependence between the input and parameter, like CHEX
[26]. However, such coarse-grained dependence without de-
tailed propagation knowledge sometimes is not enough. To
this end, we choose to output some input-related variable
values into our result logs, such as the log like Input:r4 =
r2.getStringExtra("referrer"), where r2 is the original
Input or Intent object. In this way, we can obtain more
expressive and meaningful result logs.
3.3 Semi-auto Guided Analysis
We need to further filter some false positives in the ini-
tial set of potential ECVs identified by previous analysis.
These false positives are mainly from two VSink categories:
VS_DirectByParam and VS_Input. The reason is that VSinks
in these two categories generally rely on parameters to ex-
hibit their specific behaviors. Therefore, analyzing these
VSinks is usually sink-specific and parameter-specific, mean-
ing that we have to combine detailed sinks and their param-
eter values for detection. However, it is nearly impossible for
ECVDetector to automatically handle it, because too much
domain knowledge is needed.
To address this issue, we propose semi-auto guided anal-
ysis to quickly filter false positives. Its basic process is il-
lustrated in Figure 4. In particular, we take advantage of
the result logs outputted by ECVDetector. Figure 3 shows
the logs of example false positives in the VS_DirectByParam
category. Specifically, we first collect all unique results logs
from VS_DirectByParam and VS_Input. Then, we conduct
manual analysis to find all false positive logs and their pat-
terns. This step largely relies on expert knowledge. Little
effort is actually required because many logs are similar. Fi-
nally, we apply our extracted false positive log pattern to all
related apps and take scripts to automatically filter those
matched cases.
Automatic Filtering
Guided Analysis
Unique Result Logs
VS_DirectByParaVS_Input
Figure 4: Basic process of semi-auto guided analysis.
4. ECVDetector IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented ECVDetector with 4,565 lines of
Java code, Python scripts and shell scripts. As shown in
Figure 5, ECVDetector consists of four components. Specif-
ically, Manifest Analyzer is implemented only in Python
scripts, while the other three components (i.e., Entry Point
Locator, Vulnerability Analyzer and VSink Selector) are
based on the Soot framework [24]. ECVDetector contains
four execution steps: one preparation step (i.e., step 0 at the
bottom of Figure 5) and three analysis steps. The prepara-
tion step is executed only once for generating VSinks. Then,
ECVDetector analyzes each Android app for ECVs in three
consecutive analysis steps.
VSink Selector. By running VSink Selector with the
inputs of Android framework code and Stowaway permis-
sion mappings, we obtain a total of 372 categorized VSinks.
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"mount" to '$r10 = virtualinvoke $r9.<java.lang.Runtime: java.lang.Process exec(java.lang.String)>("mount")'
"logcat -d " to '$r14 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.Runtime: java.lang.Process exec(java.lang.String)>($r13)'
"referrer" to 'virtualinvoke r0.<android.database.sqlite.SQLiteDatabase: int delete(...)>("referrer", null, null)'
Figure 3: Logs showing example false positives in VS_DirectByParam category.
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Figure 5: ECVDetector architecture. VSink Selec-
tor and Vulnerability Analyzer are two major com-
ponents to implement our sink-driven approach.
Among them, 137 APIs are VS_Direct, 23 VS_DirectByParam,
167 VS_Input, and 45 VS_Public. Moreover, to facilitate de-
tecting ECVs involving sensitive sources, we also select 183
VSource based on the results of Stowaway and SuSi [2]. As
regards to the data sinks in SuSi, we find most of them
cannot serve our vulnerability-specific purpose, due to their
selection motivation for privacy leak detection.
To adopt the Stowaway mapping into our VSinks, how-
ever, faces a technical challenge that method signatures in
Stowaway mapping are incomplete. In fact, these incomplete
signatures are only sub-signatures without return-value types,
thus would incur inaccuracy for Vulnerability Analyzer. To
this end, we design several estimation rules to restore com-
plete method signatures by analyzing corresponding An-
droid framework code. Moreover, since our analysis program
requires right method sub-signatures to facilitate signature
restoring, we unexpectedly identify several kinds of inaccu-
racy issues existing in Stowaway results. These issues exist
might because Stowaway also employs some manual efforts
to produce the mapping, thus introduce some inaccuracies.
We then ran our analysis program several times to inspect
the error messages (in each run), which prevents us to suc-
cessfully restore all signatures. For identified issues in each
run, we manually fix them by batch replacing.
Manifest Analyzer. This component consists of two
parts: an xml parser to extract all essential information in-
side each manifest file, and a script to identify exposed com-
ponents by analyzing extracted information. We determine
exposed components according to the rule in §2.1.
Entry Point Locator. The main task of Entry Point Lo-
cator is to locate all entry points, which would serve as the
starting points for Vulnerability Analyzer. Basically, entry
points are fixed callback interfaces defined by Android pro-
gramming paradigm, such as onCreate and onStart. Partic-
ularly, onCreate is an initialization point which will be called
when a component is started up. Moreover, several kinds of
entry points are special, in terms of they can accept external
attack inputs. While other points either take zero param-
eter (e.g., onResume and onStop), or only contain inputs
cannot be manipulated by attacker (e.g., Bundle argument
in Activity’s onCreate entry point). Since VS_Input ECV
detection is related to those special entry points, we identify
them in Android framework and list in Table 1. Three kinds
of components contain such entry points we concerned, while
Activity needs to actively call getIntent fucntion to receive
external inputs.
Table 1: Our aimed entry point functions.
Component Callback functions that accept attack inputs
Service
onBind(Intent intent)
onStart(Intent intent, int startId)
onStartCommand(Intent intent, int flags, int Id)
onHandleIntent(Intent intent)
handleMessage(Message msg)
Receiver onReceive(Context context, Intent intent)
Provider
query(Uri, String[], String, String[], String)
insert(Uri, ContentValues)
update(Uri, ContentValues, String, String[])
delete(Uri, String, String[])
openFile (Uri, String)
Another task is to model lifecycle for identified entry points.
This is necessary because the entry points will not call each
other due to their callback nature, thus cause disconnected
static flows. Moreover, there are some initialization func-
tions even before the onCreate interface, such as <clinit>
and <init>. We also need to consider them in modeling life-
cycle, so that backward module could backtrack to the initial
definition. In the current ECVDetector, we model the life-
cycle by defining several continuous phases. Each phase may
contain a manually connected flow or several asynchronous
entry points. For example, we define an “initial” phase to
connect the initial flow (i.e., <clinit> → <init> → onCre-
ate), and a “main” phase to cover all asynchronous special
entry points in Table 1.
Vulnerability Analyzer. This component mainly per-
forms the sink-driven forward and backward analysis in §3.2.
In the process of implementing Vulnerability Analyzer, we
come across two major technical issues due to: (1) object-
oriented (OO) language used by Android development, and
(2) Android’s event-driven nature.
The first issue arises from the inheritance nature of OO
language during the call site resolving in the forward mod-
ule. To obtain the target method of a call site, it is essential
to resolve the type of target class object. However, due to
the inheritance, it is hard to statically determine what con-
crete class an object would represent. More specifically, the
inheritance nature allows developer to use superclass or in-
terface type to represent a subclass object, which causes the
ambiguity. We tackle this problem to a great extent by lever-
aging typed Soot IR [24], which is calculated by a fast type
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inference algorithm [4]. Besides the object type resolving,
OO language’s inheritance nature also makes locating the
right method definition complex, even if we have obtained
the exact object type. For example, toString method in-
voked by android.graphics.Bitmap object is actually not
defined by Bitmap class itself. Indeed, we have to track
back to java.lang.Object class to obtain the method def-
inition of toString. A straightforward way for mitigating
this problem is to maintain a comprehensive class hierarchy.
In our ECVDetector prototype, we also take advantage of
the automatic method resolution provided by Soot according
to Java Virtual Machine Specification [25].
The second issue is the static flow discontinuity problem
caused by Android’s event-driven nature [19]. A typical dis-
connected example is the flow between start() and run()
method in java.lang.Thread class. In fact, Android OS
connects these two methods dynamically through the un-
derlying thread scheduler. However, a static tool, without
specific knowledge, cannot directly predict this kind of dy-
namic connecting behavior. Nevertheless, it is necessary for
Android static analysis tools to tackle this problem in a satis-
factory way. Otherwise, some false negatives would arise. In
ECVDetector, we model a number of dynamic flow connect-
ing behaviors as pre-defined knowledge to build continuous
call chains. The main modeled flow connecting behaviors are
summarized in Table 2. According to this table, ECVDetec-
tor is capable to connect the disconnected flows occurred in
thread scheduling, timers, location updates, and so on.
Table 2: The main dynamic flow connecting behav-
iors modeled by ECVDetector.
Class name Modeled Flows
Thread start → run
AsyncTask execute → doInBackground
Handler sendMessage → handleMessage
Timer schedule → run
LocationManager requestLocationUpdates
→ LocationListener
TelephonyManager listen → PhoneStateListener
5. EVALUATION
To evaluate the efficacy and performance of ECVDetec-
tor, we carried out an evaluation with top 1K Android apps
from Google Play. The reason we evaluated these popular
apps is that the impact of ECVs relies on the popularity of
vulnerable apps. In other words, vulnerable apps with few
installs would not cause big security impact, because it is
less likely to let those limited users also install the attack
apps. Specifically, these top apps were selected according to
their user review numbers, and most of them were crawled
recently (between June and July 2013). Therefore, our app
dataset could represent the recent versions of top Google
Play apps that users may install in their phones. Moreover,
our selected apps were fully unique in terms of the package
names, which made our dataset more distributed.
In this section, we first discuss how we conducted the
experiment with this dataset, including some findings and
knowledge we obtained during the procedure of experiment.
Then we report our identified ECVs and conduct case stud-
ies of some representative vulnerable apps. Finally, we de-
pict the result of performance evaluation for ECVDetector.
5.1 Experiment and Findings
One essential step before the ECVDetector experiment is
to extract the AndroidManifest.xml for each app. As men-
tioned in §4, we took apktool for unpacking the app and
obtaining the manifest file. However, we found not all apps
could be correctly handled by apktool. Indeed, six apps of
our dataset fail and crash apktool with several Java excep-
tions, maybe due to the potential bugs in apktool or some
apps try to protect itself from the decompiling of apktool
[30]. This finding also gives a kind hint to all previous work
based on apktool, such as [12] and [20].
We then leveraged the Manifest Analyzer component of
ECVDetector to discover exposed components from the rest
of 994 apps. Among them, we successfully parsed and ana-
lyzed 992 manifest files. The two failure cases were due to
the invalid encodings that cannot be handled by the Python
XML DOM library. More specifically, one failed case (the
popular Titanium Backup app) contains the Chinese and
Korean characters for some component names. These two
failed manifest files could be manually analyzed for obtain-
ing exposed components, but in this paper we just ignored
them for the automatic experiment.
In summary, we identified a total of 7,664 exposed com-
ponents from the remaining 992 apps, and 6,582 of them
were unique in terms of the component name. The detailed
amounts of exposed components classified by component
types are illustrated in Figure 6. One major finding based
on this figure is that there are significantly more Activity
and Broadcast Receiver exposed components than the other
two component types, around ten times. The reason behind
this can be explained by these two facts. First, many apps
need exposed Activities to finish the user intention of app
switching, such as launching from the launcher app. Second,
in order to receive system broadcasts, the corresponding Re-
ceivers have to expose themselves to the Android framework.
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Figure 6: The amounts of all and unique exposed
components across four component types.
Our experiment for ECV detection focused on the exposed
Services and Broadcast Receivers. More specifically, our tar-
get was 2,551 unique exposed components, including 378
Services and 2,173 Receivers (see Figure 6). The reason for
skipping Activities is mainly because exploiting Activity vul-
nerabilities usually requires user’s intention (e.g., the Adobe
Activity vulnerability shown in [7]), and the complicated at-
tacks against Browser Activities [31] are out of the scope of
our paper (see §2.2). As for Content Providers, although
ECVDetector is capable of statically detecting some poten-
tial Provider vulnerabilities, heavy manual efforts are still
8
required even with the dedicated ContentScope [36] tool.
Next, we ran ECVDetector against those 2,551 exposed
components. The experiment was performed on a single
Dell PowerEdge storage server, equipped with four 2.40GHz
CPUs and 12GB of RAM. To optimize the throughout, we
set the timeout for processing each component to two min-
utes. This threshold was quite reasonable, because we found
most of components could be analyzed within 10 seconds
(see §5.3 later).
During the experiment, we found it was challenging to pre-
vent Soot from crashing when loading Java classes for anal-
ysis. We spent many efforts to make ECVDetector success-
fully analyze all 2,551 components, and our knowledge listed
as follows might be helpful other Soot-based Android tools
[16, 28, 34]. The first knowledge is that we should provide as
many underlying Android classes as possible to Soot. These
classes would help Soot resolve most of Android-specific
types. Specifically, we provided eight platforms of Android
SDKs to Soot, from the old 1.6 to the recent 4.3. Moreover,
two platforms of hidden and system Android APIs were also
provided to Soot, as well as one version of the Google APIs
(e.g., Google Map APIs). However, we still encountered
many failed cases due to missing app-specific classes. In or-
der to solve this issue, we made use of the second knowledge:
ask Soot to only load classes on demand, and if errors still
occur then set the Soot option allow_phantom_refs. This
option would let Soot create a phantom class for each miss-
ing class.
Another interesting finding is about system-only broad-
casts, which are discussed in §3.2.3. Our finding about these
broadcasts for the 2173 exposed Receivers is divided into
three parts. First, we identify 433 of them contained the
checking for system-only broadcasts in their codes. This
result suggests our designed validation capability (§3.2.3)
could effectively alert the false positives due to system-only
broadcast checking. Second, total 40 broadcasts of our se-
lected 133 system-only broadcasts are checked. Third, we
also count the numbers of checked broadcasts, and the top
three result is listed in Table 3. The fourth most checked
broadcast is TIMEZONE_CHANGED, but with only 19 times.
Table 3: Top 3 checked system-only broadcasts.
The Checked System-only Broadcast #
android.intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED 157
android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY CHANGE 57
android.intent.action.PACKAGE ADDED 43
Through the automatic analysis for the 2,551 exposed
components of 992 apps, we discovered the initial set of po-
tential ECVs with 348 affected apps. As previously shown
in Figure 1, this result was analyzed only by the forward
and backward analysis in ECVDetector. We still needed to
perform the semi-auto guided analysis for two ECV cate-
gories (VS_DirectByParam and VS_Input), as discussed in
§3.3. Specifically, there were 172 and 357 unique logs (need
guided analysis) for VS_DirectByParam and VS_Input, re-
spectively. Nevertheless, most of them were similar to each
other, only 6 kinds of VS_DirectByParam APIs and 16 kinds
of VS_Input APIs were identified. Therefore, we did not
spend much effort (around one hour in total) in validating
these logs. ECVDetector then automatically filtered var-
ious sink-specific false positives according to our extracted
log pattern. Eventually, we identified a total of 103 potential
vulnerable apps. More specifically, there are 31 apps affected
with potential VS_Direct ECVs, 25 for VS_DirectByParam,
56 for VS_Input, and 16 for VS_Public.
5.2 Identified ECVs
The 103 potential vulnerable apps (identified in the last
section) were further manually verified for the real ECVs,
due to the lack of ground truth. The result of this man-
ual verification mainly relies on the domain knowledge of
security analysts and their defined boundary about bug and
vulnerability, as discussed in §2.2. In our verification pro-
cess, we tried to follow a relatively more conservative prin-
ciple than the closest related work CHEX [26]. A typical
example is that the vulnerable case of “Object embedded
in input used to start Activity” in CHEX would not be di-
rectly treated as a vulnerability in our principle. Instead,
we also require this action of starting Activity could make
some security impact to the internal status of victim apps
for becoming an ECV. Some related preliminary knowledge
and discussion could be also found in §2.2.
Overall results. In the end, we tagged 49 apps as vulnera-
ble from 103 candidate ones. We confirmed them mainly by
carefully auditing the decompiled codes and manifest files
(with the help of result logs and call chains produced by
ECVDetector), similar to the verification used by CHEX.
Note that for each vulnerable app, we only tagged it to one
major ECV category, even if this app might be affected by
several ECVs. The main result is summarized in Table 4,
including the number of each category of identified ECVs
and their corresponding representative vulnerable apps. To
the best of our knowledge, most of them are not disclosed
previously, thus are the zero-day ECVs. Since these vulner-
able apps are from top 1K in Google Play, their vulnera-
bilities may incur real security consequences among many
users. We have reported several particularly serious cases to
corresponding vendors, and received the acknowledgements
from Go Dev team and LinkedIn.
The true positive rate of ECVDetector is not high (i.e.,
47.6%, 49/103), but we argue this is acceptable when con-
sider the following two factors. The first factor is the afore-
mentioned conservative verification principle we used, which
cause us to report less vulnerabilities. Some VS_Input APIs
are the most affected by this principle, mainly the IPC APIs
(e.g., startActivity and startService). This problem
could be migrated when further cross-component inspec-
tion is involved. The second is due to the characteristics
of some our selected sinks. For instance, the removeAccount
VS_Direct API is commonly used in a reasonable scenario—
when an user logs out her account, the corresponding app
then removes her local account cache from the phone—which
should not be treated as an vulnerability. However, it is hard
for ECVDetector to recognize this normal situation of API
usage.
Case studies. We now conduct three cases studies to
demonstrate ECVDetector’s capability of detecting real se-
rious ECVs under different categories. For each case, we
further write an exploit in a zero-permission app to con-
firm the corresponding ECV could be effectively exploited.
Automatically generating exploits is an interesting topic for
aiding static analysis, but is out of our paper scope and will
be a future work. Here we hide app version information in
case that some users are still using the vulnerable versions
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Table 4: Four categories of identified ECVs and their representative vulnerable apps.
ECV Category
# of Representative Apps
Apps Package Name Vulnerability Description
VS_Direct 6
com.jb.gosms Force it to send SMS to phone no. specified by input
com.gau.go.launcherex.
Force it to enable or disable wifi and bluetooth
gowidget.switchwidget
com.bwx.bequick Force it to open the camera as flash light
VS_DirectByParam 5
com.cleanmaster.mguard Force it to silently uninstall arbitrary apps and etc.
mominis.Generic
Force it to delete its internal “MESSAGE” database table
Android.Ninja Chicken
VS_Input 25
com.zlango.zms Force it to change the status of messages in SMS databases
com.antivirus Start the private core AVService with extras specified by input
com.doubleTwist.
Start a private service with dangerous action named “delete db”
androidPlayer
com.linkedin.android Launch a network request with the attributes specified by input
com.ebuddy.android The beta update Receiver can be cheated to download fake apps
VS_Public 13
com.symantec.
getLastKnownLocation() is outputted to the logcat
mobilesecurity
air.com.bitrhymes.bingo getDeviceId() along with post URL are outputted to the logcat
com.levelup.touiteur getAllNetworkInfo() is outputted to the logcat
com.sec.spp.push getConnectionInfo() is outputted to the logcat
of apps.
Go SMS Pro (com.jb.gosms) is the top 1 messaging app
with over 60 million installs. ECVDetector identified its ex-
posed CellValidateService component leaked a security-
critical flow path which arrived at the sendTextMessage sink
API under the VS_Direct category. Moreover, its first pa-
rameter for assigning target phone number is completely
controllable by external Intent. Thus, a zero-permission
attack app can force Go SMS Pro to send SMS to arbi-
trary phone number. We also prepared a demo video (at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwtNCwAHSRs) and re-
ported it to Go Dev team on Sep 9 2013. From their active
response, we knew we were the first reporter on this issue.
This demonstrates the efficacy of ECVDetector, even when
sendTextMessage is a commonly-used sink.
Clean Master (com.cleanmaster.mguard) is a quite pop-
ular clean up app with over 200 million worldwide installs.
ECVDetector identified an external Intent can control its
exposed LocalService to do privileged operations, such as
clean up memory, restore apps, and silently uninstall arbi-
trary apps. Take silently uninstalling apps as an example,
the flow to a VS_DirectByParam command execution API
could be injected into attacker-supplied parameters (e.g., a
victim app). Clean Master then executes the “pm uninstall”
command to do silent uninstallation (of course, root per-
mission needs to be pre-granted). This case demonstrates
ECVDetector can uncover serious VS_DirectByParam vul-
nerabilities.
Lango Messaging (com.zlango.zms) is another top mes-
saging app with over one million installs. ECVDetector
identified an external Intent (at its data field) can flow into a
VS_Input API (called ContentResolver.update) via the ex-
posed ZmsSentReceiver component. We further found this
exposed sensitive flow can enable a zero-permission app to
maliciously change the status of some SMS messages. For
example, a draft SMS can be changed into the “sent” status
and this changing will be reflected in the UI of all installed
messaging apps. Even worse, an incoming SMS can be set
as an outgoing message, thus indirectly producing fake SMS
messages. This case shows the capability of ECVDetector
to detect VS_Input ECVs.
However, generating an effective exploit for Lango Mes-
saging is surprisingly challenging, nearly taking us one-day
effort. The major difficulty is how to obtain an appropri-
ate Uri data field from infinite candidates with the for-
mat of “content://”. The only hint is a domain knowledge
required condition judgment (MessageItem.getBoxId() !=
2). Eventually, we figure out the MessageItem object (from
MessageItemManager.get(Uri)) refers to a SMS message,
and its status should be not as “sent”. Therefore, a target
Uri can be “content://sms/inbox||draft/id”. The next
step is to calculate a right message id. Since the attack app
has no READ_SMS permission, it needs to launch brute-force
attempts. In summary, this case shows static detection tools
(like ECVDetector) and manual analysis are still necessary.
By contrast, automatic exploit generation (like fuzzing [27,
33] or symbolic execution [35]) is nearly impossible for han-
dling this case, due to the lack of domain knowledge and
setting up related system conditions (in this case, some in-
coming and draft SMS have to be prepared).
VS_Public ECVs are relatively not so serious, and require
more app-specific conditions to trigger the vulnerable paths.
Therefore, we skip their case studies in this paper.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
ECVDetector spent 6h 33m 35s to analyze the total 2,551
exposed components. Therefore, the average processing time
for each component was 9.257s. This result suggests the
threshold time of two minutes is quite reasonable. Among
the 2,551 components, we found only 35 of them arrived
this timeout value. The reason might be the complicated re-
cursion codes that ECVDetector cannot recognize, although
we have designed some mechanisms to help ECVDetector
handle simple recursion. We further give the detailed per-
formance measurement for the rest of 2,516 components, as
shown in Figure 7. It is easy to determine that most of com-
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Figure 7: Detailed performance measurement.
ponents could be analyzed within 10 seconds. Therefore, we
conclude that the performance of ECVDetector is high.
6. DISCUSSION
The false positives shown in the last section are mainly
due to the variable semantics of the VS_DirectByParam and
VS_Input APIs. It is hard to reduce these false positives
even with dynamic analysis, because they also cannot de-
termine which parameter values are critical and harmful.
However, security analysts can extract the pattern of false
positives from existing manual analysis, and feed them into
the automatic filtering module of our guided analysis (§3.3).
In this way, some false positives could be further excluded
automatically.
Similar to other works, there are also some false negatives
in the current ECVDetector prototype. However, it is hard
to measure their quantity due to the lack of ground truth.
Thus, we discuss several possible causes for these false nega-
tives as follows. First, our modeling for connecting dynamic
flows (see Table 2) is not intended to be complete, but we
have tried our best to cover the common cases, similar to [19,
36]. Second, although we have proposed a systematic strat-
egy to collect many sinks, it is impossible to cover a complete
set. Third, our current implementation of backtracking call
chains is also not prefect in that we skip analyzing other
callee methods in the same level of hierarchy for code sim-
plicity and performance consideration. Fortunately, only a
small number produce false negatives is due to this limita-
tion. Finally, the cross-component and cross-app ECVs [32]
are not considered in our work, but we could leverage Epicc
[28] to build a knowledge database and handle these cases.
7. RELATED WORK
Exposed Component Vulnerability. This class of vul-
nerabilities has attracted much research effort recently, af-
ter Davi et al. [9] presents the basic ECV model focusing
on permission leaks. Subsequently, several detection meth-
ods with different foci have been proposed. One category of
these methods includes ComDroid [8] and Epicc [28], both
of them try to identify several potential security flaws dur-
ing the Intent-based communication. As mentioned in §2.2,
they aim at discovering all attack surfaces and give security
warnings. Therefore, they do not conduct sink-based anal-
ysis as ours. As a result, they issue many potential ECV
warnings, but it is hard to uncover true ECVs that have
security impacts.
Another category of methods performs sink-based flow
analysis to identify vulnerabilities more accurately. Specif-
ically, Woodpecker [19] and DroidChecker [7] leverage path
reachability analysis to detect capability or permission leaks,
which generally belong to our VS_Direct ECV category ex-
cept for the non-ECV vulnerabilities on unauthorized Intent
receipt. SEFA [32] further extends this idea by adopting
content leak detection [36] in exposed Content Providers.
CHEX [26], on the other hand, employs inter-procedural
and context-sensitive dataflow techniques to locate suspi-
cious ECV flows terminating at the data sinks (i.e., our
VS_Input and VS_Public APIs).
Similar to other sink-based analysis systems, ECVDetec-
tor also conducts path reachability and dataflow analysis.
However, unlike previous works, these two kinds of analysis
techniques are organically combined together and driven by
the classified categories of VSinks in our approach. In par-
ticular, we take the backward, instead of previous forward,
dataflow analysis for adapting more categories of sinks, such
as the VS_DirectByParam category. These categorized VSinks
are obtained by our systematic VSink selection strategy,
which also assists ECVDetector to cover more ECVs that
are not addressed by previous work. Additionally, we further
design semi-auto guided analysis and system-only broadcast
checking capability to efficiently exclude some false positives.
Besides detection techniques, several defense methods are
proposed to mitigate ECV issues. In general, they are dy-
namic enforcing systems, therefore required to modify An-
droid source code. They propose to check IPC call chains
[15, 10], or even other channels like sockets and files [5]. On
the other hand, Kantola et al. [23] tries to automatically
reduce unnecessary exposed surfaces. Moreover, mandatory
access control is tailored to Android [29, 6], and it could
block ECV attacks with appropriate policies. Quite recently,
AppSealer [34] aims to automatically generate patches for
preventing attacks to exploit ECVs. All these works are
complementary to our work, since they might be applied to
prevent attackers from exploiting our discovered ECVs.
Sink Selection in App Analysis. Many app analysis
tools rely on sinks to perform their individual analysis. How-
ever, most of their sinks are selected in a manual fashion [13,
22, 11, 19, 36]. Some works make use of API-to-permission
mappings [14, 3] to obtain their target sinks, such as [17,
18, 26]. However, due to the lack of systematic strategy
and flexible rules like our own, it is not easy for them to
systematically extract appropriate sinks and filter useless
ones from all candidate mappings. Moreover, we craft cen-
tralized rules to adopt the privileged APIs not covered by
existing mappings, as well as other non-privileged APIs like
database APIs. Another related work is SuSi [2], which em-
ployed machine learning techniques to select data sinks for
privacy leak detection. However, we cannot use SuSi to se-
lect our VSinks because of the variable API semantics and
that we also consider non-data sinks.
A contribution of this paper is the semi-auto VSink clas-
sification. SuSi and CHEX also define categories for their
selected sinks, but their categories are not meant for cap-
turing different analysis requirements like ours. In fact, the
categories in SuSi are only the API types (e.g., Network
and File sinks). Similarly, CHEX defines three sink tags
for just differentiating different data sinks. On the other
hand, although both DroidChecker [7] and AdRisk [18] sep-
arate their sinks into two categories for analysis, they are not
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fully aimed at detecting ECV detection, thus not sufficient
for all analysis requirements in ECV detection. Indeed, one
of their categories is either for detecting unauthorized Intent
receipt or for privacy leak detection.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new sink-driven approach
to systematically tackle the ECV detection problem. This
approach includes a systematic strategy for VSink selection
and classification, and a general detection method to iden-
tify potential ECVs in Android apps. We implemented our
sink-driven approach in a tool called ECVDetector. We suc-
cessfully identified a total of 49 vulnerable apps across all
four ECV categories in the top 1K Android apps. Future
works include helping developers fix their vulnerable apps
and deploying ECVDetector as a web-based detection ser-
vice.
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APPENDIX
A. SYSTEM-ONLY BROADCAST CHECK-
ING
<receiver android:name="com.example.BootReceiver">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name=
   "android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED"/>
    </intent-filter>
</receiver>
Figure 8: An example Broadcast Receiver register-
ing the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
public class BootReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
  public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
    if ("android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED".
          equals(intent.getAction())) {
             // other codes
    }
  }
}
Figure 9: A typical code pattern for checking
system-only broadcasts.
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